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On the Computational Security
of a Distributed Key Distribution Scheme
Vanesa Daza, Javier Herranz, and Germa´n Sa´ez
Abstract—In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key.
Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted
group. In this work, we formalize the security analysis of one such scheme [11] which was not considered in the original proposal. We
prove the scheme is secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve.
We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in [24] which allows us to prove the security of the schemes without
assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the
cost of an efficiency loss.
Index Terms—Cryptography, key distribution, secret sharing schemes, provable security.
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
THERE are many situations where a group (or conference)of users needs a common secret key in order to use it
for some purposes such as for secure communication by
using symmetric encryption techniques or to allow the
access to some restricted resource such as forums in the
Internet or multiplayer computer games or, in general, to
identify the members of the conference in front of each
other or in front of external entities.
There are some different ways in which these users can
securely obtain this common key, depending on the
resources available to them. For example, in group key
exchange protocols [7], the users broadcast partial values
that allow all of them, after a certain number of rounds of
communication, to securely compute the same group key.
Current schemes [5], [22] work with only three or four
rounds of communication.
Group key distribution schemes [12], [23] are also
managed by the users of the group themselves, but are
more suitable for dynamic situations, where users can join
or leave the group at any period of time, which is decided
by the own group members. This dynamism capability
makes these schemes slightly different from group key
exchange protocols, which must be reinitialized every time
that the composition of the group changes.
A drawback of these two approaches is that there must be
some kind of synchronization among the users because they
must all execute the protocol at the same time. In some
scenarios, this can be a problem and it is desirable that every
user be able to obtain the conference keywhenever hewants.
To achieve this property, Needham and Schroeder [25]
proposed considering a key distribution center which
computes and stores the conference keys and sends them
to the users when they contact it. However, this solution
has some drawbacks: The center is a bottleneck of the
system, a possible point of failure, and a clear target for
attacks because it knows all of the keys of the system.
To overcome these problems, Naor et al. [24] introduced
the notion of distributed key distribution schemes. The task of
the key distribution center is shared among a set of servers
which independently send some information to the users,
which allows them to compute the conference key. In a
nutshell, the protocol is divided into three different phases.
In the initialization phase, servers jointly generate some
shared secret information. Later, in the key request phase, a
user asks some servers for a conference key; servers check
that this user actually belongs to the conference and, if so,
each of them uses its share of the secret information to
compute a partial conference key. In the key delivery phase,
the user combines the received information to obtain the
final conference key. A necessary property is that all of the
users in the same conference must obtain the same key,
independently of the set of servers that they contact.
1.1 Related Work
Distributed key distribution schemes have been considered
in both information-theoretic [4], [10], [24] and computa-
tional [11], [13], [24] frameworks. The first proposal of
distributed key distribution schemes in a computational
framework was given in the original paper [24] as a natural
application of the concept of threshold pseudorandom
functions (TPRFs). Although the specific security of
distributed key distribution schemes was not considered
there, they proved that their TPRFs satisfy some properties
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(in the random oracle model and under the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption), which directly implies
that the resulting distributed key distribution schemes are
secure in the formal model defined some years later. The
proposal in [24] pursues increasing server availability and
decreasing network communication; it does not take very
much consideration of the computational costs for servers
and users.
In [11], an alternative scheme was proposed with the
goal of reducing the computational load on the users,
which was quite heavy in the proposals of [24]. The price
for this improvement is increasing the computational and
communication costs for the servers. The idea is that this
different way of distributing the costs of the scheme can
make more sense in practice because servers are assumed
to be powerful devices, whereas users can be mobile
devices (PDAs, mobile phones, etc.) with low computa-
tional resources. In such situations, a user can broadcast a
query for a key to a set of servers and expects to receive the
key quite directly, without needing to perform some extra
operations to obtain it (other than decrypting). On the other
hand, servers can be, in some way, paid for doing most of
the work. However, the proposal in [11] did not include
any formal security analysis.
The first explicit and formal security model for dis-
tributed key distribution schemes in the computational
framework was given in [13]. Roughly speaking, a
distributed key distribution scheme is secure if an adver-
sary who corrupts some subset of servers and some
conferences of users has no information about the key of
a different, and noncorrupted, conference. In the same
work, a general construction of secure distributed key
distribution schemes starting from distributed signature
schemes was provided.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this work, we formally prove that the scheme in [11]
enjoys the security properties required for distributed key
distribution schemes. The proof is by reduction to the
hardness of the DDH problem in the random oracle model.
We consider malicious adversaries and, so, we add
mechanisms such as verifiable secret sharing and zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge to detect dishonest
participants.
We also detail how to modify a part of the scheme in
order to avoid the use of a specific hash function, which is
modeled as a random oracle in the security proofs. This
modification was already mentioned (briefly) in [24] and is
valid for the scheme proposed there as well. As usually
happens, the improvement in the security of the schemes is
at the cost of a reduction in their efficiency because now the
servers must maintain a table where each conference is
assigned one value jointly chosen by them.
1.3 Organization of This Paper
In Section 2, we describe the framework of distributed key
distribution schemes: the protocols that define such
schemes and the formal security requirements that they
must satisfy. Then, in Section 3, we recall ElGamal
encryption and a protocol for the joint generation of a
shared secret value because they are essential tools of the
scheme that we study. In Section 4, we review the
distributed key distribution scheme proposed in [11] and
then we analyze it: We add the security analysis of the
employed protocol to compute proofs of knowledge, which
provides robustness to the scheme, and we prove that the
whole scheme is secure in the random oracle model. We
propose, in Section 5, a slight modification to the schemes
in [11] and [24], which allows us to prove their security
without the (sometimes too strong) assumption that a hash
function behaves as a random oracle. Finally, we devote
Section 6 to the conclusions of this work.
2 DISTRIBUTED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Naor et al. introduced the notion of distributed key
distribution schemes in [24]. In this kind of scheme, we
have a set U ¼ fU1; . . . ; Umg of m users and a set S ¼
fS1; . . . ; Sng of n servers. Users in the same conference C  U
want to obtain a common secret key, C , for example, in
order to communicate securely with the other members of
the conference or to use it as an access key for some
restricted resources. To obtain C , users must interact with
some servers in S. The subsets of servers that are allowed to
provide conference keys are those in the access structure
  2S , which must be monotone increasing: If A1  A2 and
A1 2 , then A2 2 .
In more detail, a distributed key distribution scheme
consists of the following phases:
. Initialization phase. This phase involves only the
servers, which interact with each other. The input is
the access structure  and the output contains some
public information and partial secret information for
each server Si 2 S.
. Key request phase. In this phase, a user Uj contacts
a subset of servers in order to obtain a conference
key for some conference C to which he belongs.
Servers send to Uj some value(s) which depend on
their partial secret information, on the identity of Uj,
and on the conference C.
. Key delivery phase. Finally, the user Uj combines
the received values and tries to compute the
conference key C for the conference C. If the
contacted subset of servers belongs to the access
structure , then Uj is always able to compute the
correct C .
Communication Model. We assume the following
communication model for the distributed key distribution
scheme that we study in this paper. On the one hand,
communication between servers is done through secret and
authenticated channels, not necessarily synchronous. On
the other hand, communication between servers and users
requires authenticated channels, but does not require secret
or synchronous channels.
2.1 Security of Distributed Key Distribution
Schemes
The level of security required for distributed key distribu-
tion schemes depends on the scenario where the conference
members use the generated key and basically on the type of
attacks the application must be protected against. A high
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enough (and standard) level of security is the equivalent of
semantic security for encryption schemes [20]. Roughly
speaking, an adversary should not be able to distinguish
a conference key C from a value taken at random from the
set of possible keys, even if it corrupts some subset of
servers and the protocol is executed for other conferences.
The adversary can require the execution of the protocol for
conferences of his choice, as many times as he wants; this
corresponds to a dishonest user who starts many sessions
of the same application, with different conferences.
2.1.1 The Adversarial Model
Obviously, the number of servers that an adversary can
corrupt must be limited; otherwise, if he controls, for
example, an authorized set of servers in , he can compute
all of the conference secret keys and there is no security at
all. Therefore, an adversary structure A  2S must be
defined, containing those subsets of dishonest servers that
the system is able to tolerate. It must be monotone
decreasing: If a subset B can be corrupted by A, then any
subset contained in B can also be corrupted by A. A trivial
condition to ensure the security of the schemes in this
scenario is that A \  ¼ ;.
We deal with static but malicious adversaries. Static
means that the set of corrupted servers is chosen at the
beginning of the life of the system and remains fixed from
that moment on. Malicious means that the adversary can
put together the private information of the corrupted
parties and can force them to deviate from the correct
execution of the protocols. In this case, a standard
requirement for the designed protocols is that of robustness.
There must be mechanisms to detect the corrupted parties
which do not follow the protocol correctly; once this is
done, there must remain enough honest parties to success-
fully finish the execution of the protocol. A necessary
condition to ensure robustness is Ac  , where
Ac ¼ fP BjB 2 Ag. Throughout this paper, since we
want robustness, we will assume that this condition is
satisfied by the structures considered in the protocols.
2.1.2 Formal Security Model for Distributed Key
Distribution Schemes
The adversary against the distributed key distribution
scheme will be denoted as F . Such an adversary F is given
the public parameters of the system: the set of servers
S ¼ fS1; . . . ; Sng, the access and adversary structures  
2S and A  2S , and the set of users U ¼ fU1; . . . ; Umg.
Extending the security model introduced in [13], in-
spired by other works on key distribution (see [1], for
example), we describe here a game G, played by an
adversary F against a distributed key distribution scheme.
We consider schemes which fall inside the model explained
in this work, with an initialization phase performed only by
servers, a key request and computational phase where
servers and users interact, and a key delivery phase where
users compute the conference keys. The game G, which
captures the capabilities (requesting the execution of the
protocol, Step 3) and the goals (distinguishing a conference
key from a random key, Steps 4-6) of the adversary F ,
works as follows:
1. The adversary chooses a subset of servers B 2 A to
be corrupted.
2. The initialization phase of the distributed key
distribution scheme, which involves only servers,
is executed. The adversary F obtains all of the
public information and the secret information of the
corrupted servers Sj 2 B.
3. The adversary F adaptively chooses Qconf different
conferences C0  U. The key request and the compu-
tational phase of the scheme, as well as the key
delivery phase, are executed for each user of these
conferences, asmany times asF wants. As a result,F
obtains all of the information produced in these
executions. One could think that the adversary has
corrupted all members of such conferences C0. F
obtains the private information generated by the
corrupted servers, the informationmade public by all
of the servers, the information obtained by users inC0
(including the resulting conference key C 0 ), etc.
4. The adversary chooses a conference C different
from the conferences it has queried in the
previous step. For this conference, the key request
and computational phase of the scheme is exe-
cuted. The adversary F obtains the private
information of the corrupted servers and the
information broadcast by all the servers, but it
has no access to the secret information received by
users in C. This Step 4 can be executed in parallel
to Step 3 to allow concurrent attacks. Furthermore,
more key conference queries can be made by the
adversary after this step, for conferences C0 6¼ C,
which are answered as in Step 3.
5. A random bit b 2 f0; 1g is chosen by a challenger. If
b ¼ 1, the adversary F is given the real key C . If
b ¼ 0, the adversary is given an element taken
uniformly at random from the set of possible
conference keys.
6. The adversary F outputs a bit b0 2 f0; 1g, with b0 ¼ 1
if F thinks that the received element is actually C
and b0 ¼ 0 otherwise. It wins the game if b0 ¼ b.
We define the advantage of such an adversary F in
breaking the semantic security of the distributed key
distribution scheme as
" ¼ Pr½b0 ¼ b  1
2
:
Definition 1. An adversary F ðU;S;;A; T ; ";QconfÞ-breaks
the distributed key distribution scheme if it plays game G in
time at most T and its advantage in breaking the semantic
security of the scheme is at least ".
Regarding the protocol of Naor et al. [24], they actually
propose TPRFs which, in particular, can be easily trans-
formed into distributed key distribution schemes. They
define the security requirements for such functions and
prove that their proposal of TPRF satisfies these require-
ments, in the random oracle model, under the DDH
Assumption. It is easy to see that this fact directly implies
that the resulting distributed key distribution scheme is
secure in this formal model.
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For simplicity, we have decided to concentrate on the
case of one single session for each conference. In the case of
the studied scheme, one possibility to deal with different
sessions s would be to include another input to the hash
function H, that is, the conference key for C in the session s
would be C;s ¼ HðC; sÞ. Since, in the security proof, we
will assume that H behaves as a random oracle, this
solution would be secure. The same technique could be
applied to the scheme in [24], in order to allow different
sessions.
3 BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we review two cryptographic primitives
that will appear in the explanation of the proposal of the
distributed key distribution scheme that we study in this
work.
3.1 ElGamal Encryption
In [17], ElGamal proposed a public-key probabilistic
encryption scheme. The public parameters of the scheme
are two large primes, p and q, such that qjp 1, and an
element g verifying that the multiplicative subgroup G ¼
hgi of Z p has order q (this mathematical framework will be
common to all of the protocols explained in this work).
Every user U generates both his public and private keys
by choosing a random element x 2 Z q and computing
y ¼ gx mod p. The public key of user U is y and his private
key is x.
If someonewants to encrypt amessagem 2 G for user U ,
he chooses a random element  2 Z q and computes r ¼
g mod p and s ¼ my mod p. The ciphertext of message m
that is sent to user U is c ¼ ðr; sÞ.
When U wants to recover the original message m from
the ciphertext c ¼ ðr; sÞ, he computes
m ¼ srx mod p:
The semantic security of the ElGamal cryptosystem is
equivalent to the DDH Assumption [14], which states that
the DDH problem is hard to solve.
Definition 2 (DDH problem). We say that an algorithm is an
ð"; T Þ-solver of the DDH problem if it runs in time at most T
and distinguishes with probability at least 1=2þ " between the
two probability distributions DDH and Drand, where
DDH ¼ ðga; gb; gabÞ, for uniformly and independently chosen
values a; b 2 Z q, and Drand ¼ ðga; gb; gcÞ, for uniformly and
independently chosen values a; b; c 2 Z q.
3.2 Secret Sharing Techniques
In this section, we explain some basics on secret sharing
schemes. These schemes can also be used by a set of players
to jointly generate shares of a random secret value  2 Z q
such that the value y ¼ g mod p is public.
In a secret sharing scheme, a dealer (usually denoted by D)
distributes shares of a secret value among a set of players
P ¼ fP1; . . . ; Png in such a way that only authorized subsets
of players (those in the monotone increasing access
structure   2P) can recover the secret value from their
shares, whereas nonauthorized subsets do not obtain any
information about the secret.
Secret sharing schemes were introduced independently
by Shamir [29] and Blakley [3] in 1979. Shamir considered
threshold access structures  ¼ fA  P : jAj  tþ 1g, defined
by a threshold tþ 1, and proposed a secret sharing scheme
for these structures based on polynomial interpolation.
Other works have proposed schemes realizing more
general access structures, such as vector space secret sharing
schemes [6]. An access structure  is realizable by such a
scheme, in a finite field Z q for some prime q, if there exists a
positive integer r and an assignment of vectors  :
P [ fDg!ðZ qÞr (one for each participant) such that A 2
 if and only if  ðDÞ is a linear combination of the vectors
in f ðPiÞgPi2A. Here, D denotes a special entity (real or not),
outside the set P. If a real dealer D wants to share a secret
k 2 Z q among the players in P, he chooses a random vector
v 2 ðZ qÞr such that v   ðDÞ ¼ k. The share of each player
Pi 2 P is ki ¼ v   ðPiÞ. If A 2 , there exist values fAi gPi2A
such that  ðDÞ ¼PPi2A Ai  ðPiÞ. Then, it is easy to see that
k ¼PPi2A Ai ki mod q. Using simple linear algebra, one can
also see that subsets out of  obtain no information at all
about the secret value k.
Simmons et al. [30] introduced linear secret sharing
schemes, which can be seen as a generalization of vector
space secret sharing schemes where each player can be
assigned more than one vector (and, therefore, the length of
each share can be larger than the secret). They proved that
any access structure can be realized by a linear secret
sharing scheme, but the scheme is, in general, quite
inefficient in the sense that the rate between the length of
the secret and the length of the shares is very low.
From now on in our work, we will consider any possible
access structure , so we will know that there exists a linear
secret sharing scheme realizing this structure. For simpli-
city, we will suppose that this scheme is a vector space
scheme defined by a function  . All of the results are valid
in the more general case where each player is associated
with more than one vector as well.
3.2.1 Joint Generation of a Random Shared Secret
Value
If the secret value to be shared is a random number from
the corresponding finite field, the generation and distribu-
tion of shares in a secret sharing scheme can be performed
by the players themselves, without any external party (like
the dealer).
Now, we explain the protocol for the joint generation of
a random secret value , shared among players in P
according to the access structure . The protocol is secure
against the action of a malicious adversary who can corrupt
a subset of players in the adversary structureA. An obvious
required condition to ensure the privacy of the final secret
is  \ A ¼ ;. We assume that  can be realized by a vector
space secret sharing scheme defined by a mapping
 : P [ fDg ! ðZ qÞr. Some other parameters are public,
like p, q, and two elements g, h such that G ¼ hgi has order
q and h 2 G . The protocol, which is a generalization of the
threshold protocol in [19], consists of the following steps:
1. Each player Pi 2 P chooses at random a value ki 2
Z q and distributes it among all players in P, with the
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following verifiable secret sharing technique (which
is a generalization of [26]):
a. Pi chooses two random vectors vi ¼
ðvð1Þi ; . . . ; vðrÞi Þ a n d wi ¼ ðwð1Þi ; . . . ; wðrÞi Þ i n
ðZ qÞr such that vi   ðDÞ ¼ ki. Then, Pi
sends to each player Pj in P the pair
ðkij; k0ijÞ ¼ ðvi   ðjÞ;wi   ðjÞÞ. He also makes
public the commitments Vi‘ ¼ gv
ð‘Þ
i hw
ð‘Þ
i , for
1  ‘  r.
b. Each player Pj 2 P verifies the correctness of his
share kij by checking that
gkijhk
0
ij ¼
Yr
‘¼1
ðVi‘Þ ðPjÞ
ð‘Þ
; ð1Þ
where  ðPjÞð‘Þ is the ‘th component of the vector
 ðPjÞ. If this check fails, Pj makes public a
complaint against Pi.
c. For any complaint that Pi receives from some
player Pj, he must broadcast a pair of values
ðkij; k0ijÞ satisfying (1).
d. Player Pi is marked as disqualified if he receives a
complaint from a set of players out of A or if he
answers some complaint with values which do
not satisfy (1).
2. Each player defines the set of nondisqualified
players Qual. Since Ac  , we have that Qual 2 .
Furthermore, for all players Pi 2 Qual that pass this
phase, there are valid shares kij corresponding to
players Pj that form an authorized subset.
3. The generated random secret will be  ¼PPi2Qual ki.
Each player Pj 2 P computes his share j of the
secret  as j ¼
P
Pi2Qual kij.
4. Now, the players want to compute the value
y ¼ g ¼QPi2Qual gki 2 Z p. They use Feldman’s ver-
ifiable secret sharing scheme (see [15] for the
original threshold version):
a. Each player Pi 2 Qual broadcasts Ai‘ ¼ gv
ð‘Þ
i , for
1  ‘  r.
b. Each player Pj 2 Qual verifies if
gkij ¼
Yr
‘¼1
ðAi‘Þ ðPjÞ
ð‘Þ
: ð2Þ
If this check fails, player Pj complains by
broadcasting the pair ðkij; k0ijÞ that satisfies (1)
but does not satisfy (2).
c. If player Pi receives some valid complaint at
Step 4.b, the other players Pj 2 Qual run the
reconstruction phase of Pedersen’s scheme to
recover ki and, in particular, Ai ¼ gki . Other-
wise, the value gki is computed from the
commitments Ai‘ and the public vector  ðDÞ as
gki ¼ gvi ðDÞ ¼
Yr
‘¼1
gv
ð‘Þ
i  ðDÞð‘Þ ¼
Yt
m¼1
ðAi‘Þ ðDÞ
ð‘Þ
:
d. Finally, the value y ¼ g can be computed as
y ¼ g
P
Pi2Qual
ki ¼
Y
Pi2Qual
gki :
Something similar happens with the values
Dj ¼ gj ¼ g
P
Pi2Qual
kij
;
which can be publicly computed from the values gkij
obtained in Steps 4.b and 4.c. We denote the output of this
protocol with the expression:
ð1; . . . ; nÞ  !ðP;;AÞ ; g; fDjg1jn
 
;
where i is the share of the secret  held by player Pi and
the values g and fDjg1jn are publicly known.
It is not difficult to see that this protocol is simulatable in
the following sense: Given a corruptible subset B 2 A and a
value Y 2 G , it is possible to simulate, in polynomial time,
values which are indistinguishable from the ones that an
adversary corrupting players in B would obtain from an
execution of the protocol which outputs g ¼ Y . We denote
all this simulated information by SimðB; Y Þ. This fact
ensures that the protocol is secure because an adversary
does not obtain any information from the execution of the
protocol that he could not produce by himself.
The proof of this fact is omitted here by lack of originality
since it is basically a rewriting of the proof of simulatability of
the protocol in [19], where threshold secret sharing is
replaced with linear secret sharing. Note that this change
does not add any new subtle issue to the proof in [19], which
had been proposed to correct some flaws in previous well-
known protocols for distributed key generation [18], [26].
4 THE DISTRIBUTED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
OF DAZA ET AL.
In this section, we analyze the scheme proposed in [11]. The
goal of this paper is to prove the security of this scheme
because [11] does not include any security analysis. After
reviewing and modifying the protocols of the scheme, we
first prove that the employed proof of knowledge is secure.
Then, in Section 4.3, we will prove that the whole
distributed key distribution scheme is secure.
In the original proposal of Naor et al. [24], servers must
send the partial information to users throughout private
channels. In practice, this can be done, for example, by
using a suitable encryption scheme. Then, the user must
check the correctness of the received values and combine
some correct values to obtain the final key; this step
involves some modular exponentiations, which can be
costly to the user if he does not have enough computational
resources.
The goal of the scheme by Daza et al. [11] is to reduce the
computational effort required to the users. The idea is as
follows: Since the information received by users must be
encrypted anyway, an encryption scheme such as ElGamal
cryptosystem can be used. In general, any multiplicatively
homomorphic encryption scheme EPKðmÞ satisfying
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EPKðm1 m2Þ ¼ EPKðm1Þ  EPKðm2Þ could be used. The
partial encryptions computed by the servers can be
combined by the servers themselves (with one extra round
of communication) in order to produce an encryption of the
final conference key. This value is sent to the user, who is
the only one who can decrypt it and obtain the key. In this
way, the number of operations that users must perform is
significantly reduced at the cost of increasing the computa-
tional and communication effort required to servers. Note
that this may make sense in real scenarios where users have
low computational resources and servers are paid in some
way for doing this work.
4.1 The Scheme
Let U ¼ fU1; . . . ; Umg and S ¼ fS1; . . . ; Sng be the sets of
users and servers. Let ;A  2S be the access and
adversary structures satisfying A \  ¼ ; and Ac  .
Again, we assume that the access structure  can be
realized by a vector space secret sharing scheme. That is,
there exist a positive integer r and a function  :
S [ fDg!ðZ qÞr such tha t A 2  i f and only i f
 ðDÞ 2 h ðSiÞiSi2A.
We denote by  ¼ ð;AÞ ¼ fR  PjR B 2 ; for all
B 2 Ag   the monotone increasing family of robust
subsets. Since  and A satisfy Ac  , we know that P 2 
and so the family  is not empty. In the scheme, a user who
wants to know a conference key must contact with the
servers of some robust subset R 2 .
Let H be a hash function (collision and preimage
resistant) that inputs a conference C  U and outputs an
element in G ¼ hgi  Z p. In the security proof of the
scheme, this hash function is assumed to behave as a
random oracle (following a usual methodology introduced
in [2]).
Each userU 2 U has an ElGamal secret key x 2 Z q and the
matching public key is y ¼ gx. The parameters ðp; q;G ¼ hgiÞ
are the same for all of the servers and users in the system.
Initialization phase. In order to compute their secret
shares, servers in S jointly execute the protocol
ð1; . . . ; nÞ  !
ðS;;AÞ
; g; fDjg1jn
 
;
where ; i 2 Z q are random, as explained in Section 3.2.1.
Note that, in the proposal published in [11], a different
(and simpler) protocol for the joint generation of a random
secret is used. However, when analyzing security, one
realizes that the simpler protocol is not simulatable and,
therefore, the security of the distributed key distribution
scheme as it is in [11] cannot be proved. However, the
protocol explained in Section 3.2.1 is simulatable and the
whole scheme can be proven secure, as we will see in
Section 4.3.
Key request and computational phase. A user U in a
conference C  U asks for the conference key C to a robust
subset of servers R 2 :
1. Each server Si 2 R applies the hash function H to
the conference C, obtaining hC ¼ HðCÞ 2 G . The
conference key will be C ¼ hC .
2. Then, server Si 2 R encrypts the value hiC using the
ElGamal public key y of user U . That is,
. server Si chooses a random element i 2 Z q ,
. it computes ri ¼ gi and si ¼ hiC yi , and
. server Si broadcasts the ciphertext ci ¼ ðri; siÞ.
3. Server Si computes a noninteractive and zero-
knowledge proof of the knowledge of values i
and i, which make the ciphertext ci consistent:
Proofi ¼ PKfði; iÞ : Di ¼ gi ^ ri ¼ gi ^ si
¼ hiC yig:
More details about the design and security of this
proof of knowledge, which makes use of a hash
function H^ : f0; 1g ! Z q, are given in Section 4.2.
4. Each server Si 2 R verifies the proofs published by
the rest of the servers until it obtains correct partial
ciphertexts from an authorized subset A 2 . Notice
that such a subset in  always exists because R 2 
and, therefore, R B 2  for any possible subset B
of incorrect partial ciphertexts computed by cor-
rupted servers.
Since A 2 , we know that there exist values
fAj gSj2A such that  ¼
P
Sj2A 
A
j j.
5. Using homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryp-
tion, server Si can compute an encryption ðr; sÞ of
the conference key C ¼ hC from the values cj
broadcast by servers Sj 2 A as follows:
r ¼
Y
Sj2A
r
Aj
j ¼ g
P
Sj2A
Aj j
;
s ¼
Y
Sj2A
s
Aj
j ¼ h
P
Sj2A
Aj j
C y
P
Sj2A
Aj j
¼ hCy
P
Sj2A
Aj j
:
Since the elements fjgSj2A are random, the elementP
Sj2A 
A
j j is also random and, so, ðr; sÞ is a valid
ElGamal encryption of the message hC . We also note
that the resulting ciphertext ðr; sÞ does not depend
on the considered authorized subset A 2 .
Key delivery phase. Each server in R sends to user U the
ciphertext c ¼ ðr; sÞ that he has computed. User U selects a
value that has been sent by all of the servers of some subset
out of A (this means that there exists at least one honest
server in this subset and, so, the corresponding ciphertext
must be the correct one). The user decrypts it and obtains
the conference key C ¼ hC . Note that, as desired, the
obtained key does not depend on the set of servers who
have participated in the execution of the protocol.
4.2 The Proof of Knowledge
In the protocol described above, each server Si must
compute the proof
Proofi ¼ PK ði; iÞ : Di ¼ gi ^ ri ¼ gi ^ si ¼ hiC yi
 
:
This proof can be computed using a standard strategy [8],
[16], [28] that transforms an interactive proof of knowledge
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into a noninteractive one by using a hash function H^, which
is modeled in the security analysis as a random oracle.
For some known values A;B;C; g1; g2; g3 2 G , the proof
PK ð; Þ : A ¼ g1 ^ B ¼ g1 ^ C ¼ g2 g3
n o
can be computed as follows: Let H^ : f0; 1g ! Z q be a hash
function. The prover does the following:
1. Choose uniformly and at random u; v 2 Z q .
2. Compute T1 ¼ gu1 , T2 ¼ gv1, and T3 ¼ gu2gv3.
3. Compute h ¼ H^ðA;B;C; g1; g2; g3; T1; T2; T3Þ.
4. Compute w1 ¼ u hmod q and w2 ¼ v hmod q.
5. The proof of knowledge is the tuple ðh; w1; w2Þ.
The verifier of the proof must check if
h ¼ H^ A;B;C; g1; g2; g3; gw11 Ah; gw21 Bh; gw12 gw23 Ch
 
:
If so, then he accepts the proof; otherwise, he rejects the
proof.
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge must satisfy
three properties: correctness, which means that the verifier
always accepts the proof if the prover knows the secret
values; soundness, which means that, if a prover does not
know the secrets, then the probability that he computes a
proof that makes the verifier accept is negligible; and,
finally, zero-knowledge means that the only information that
the verifier obtains from the execution of the protocol is if
the prover knows the stated secret values or not.
The correctness of the protocol explained above is trivially
fulfilled. We next prove that the protocol also achieves the
other two properties in the random oraclemodel [2], where a
hash function is seen as a totally random function.
Soundness. We prove that an algorithm B which has
probability " to compute a valid proof knows the values 
and  with probability "2=5.
In effect, the randomness of algorithm B consists of the
randomness of the values output by the (random) hash
function H^ and the own randomness ofB. If an execution ofB
produces a tuple ðh; w1; w2Þ, then we denote as X the
randomness employed byB just before asking to the random
oracle the value H^ðA;B;C; g1; g2; g3; gw11 Ah; gw21 Bh; gw12 gw23 ChÞ.
We denote as Y the rest of randomness employed by B
(including the value output by the random oracle in the
aforementioned query).
We denote as W  X 	 Y the set of random choices (or
executions of B) that lead to a valid proof of knowledge. By
hypothesis, we have that Pr½W  ¼ ". We apply to this
situation the well-known splitting lemma (see, for example,
[27]), also known as heavy-row lemma.
Then, there exists V W such that, for all ðx; yÞ 2 V ,
we have
Pr
y0
ðx; y0Þ 2W½   "
2
and Pr½V jW   1
2
:
When we execute B with randomness ðx; yÞ, we will
obtain ðx; yÞ 2 V with probability at least "=2. In this case,
we execute B again with fixed x and random y0. With
probability at least "=2, the new execution ðx; y0Þ belongs to
W , that is, it also leads to a valid proof of knowledge.
Since H^ and H^ 0 are random functions, the probability
that
h ¼ H^ðA;B;C; g1; g2; g3; gu1 ; gv1; gu2gv3Þ
¼ H^ 0ðA;B;C; g1; g2; g3; gu1 ; gv1; gu2gv3Þ ¼ h0
is 1=q. Since q > 5, we have in particular that the probability
that h 6¼ h0 is 1 1=q > 4=5.
Summing up, B would obtain with probability at least
"=2  "=2  ðq  1=qÞ > "2=5 two valid proofs of knowledge
ðh; w1; w2Þ corresponding to the randomness ðx; yÞ and
ðh0; w01; w02Þ corresponding to the randomness ðx; y0Þ such
that h 6¼ h0.
Since the randomness x is equal until the crucial query to
the random oracle H^, we get
. gw11 A
h ¼ gw011 Ah
0
and
. gw21 B
h ¼ gw021 Bh
0
.
The first statement implies that
w1 þ h ¼ w01 þ h0 mod q;
whereas the second statement implies
w2 þ h ¼ w02 þ h0 mod q:
Therefore, algorithm B can compute
 ¼ w1  w
0
1
h0  h mod q and  ¼
w2  w02
h0  h mod q:
Zero knowledge. We show that a verifier does not
obtain any new information from the execution of the
protocol other than the proof itself. In order to prove this,
we show that the verifier himself could have computed a
valid proof of knowledge which is indistinguishable from a
real one computed by an honest prover in the random
oracle model.
In effect, the verifier can choose at random
w1; w2; h 2 Z q. Then, he can impose that
H^ A;B; C; g1; g2; g3; g
w1
1 A
h; gw21 B
h; gw12 g
w2
3 C
h
  ¼ h:
Since the hash function H^ is assumed to behave as a totally
random function (the proof is valid in the random oracle
model), then this step is consistent and produces a valid
proof of knowledge which is indistinguishable from a real
one computed by an honest prover who knows  and .
This is true if the value imposed on the hash function H^ in
the simulation does not produce a collision with previously
assigned values.
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that the scheme of Daza et al.,
explained in Section 4.1, is secure with respect to the formal
model explained in Section 2.1.2 as long as the DDH
problem (see Definition 2) is hard to solve. As happens with
the scheme of Naor et al. [24], the proof is valid in the
random oracle model for the hash functions H and H^. In
Section 5, we will explain how it is possible to erase this
assumption for the hash function H (this modification is
valid for both schemes). This will be at the cost of a loss in
efficiency.
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Theorem 1. Assume that the distributed key distribution scheme
of Daza et al. can be ðU;S;;A; T ; ";QconfÞ-broken with QH
queries to the random oracle H and QH^ queries to the random
oracle H^, satisfying Qconf < q=ð2nÞ and QH^ < q2=2.
Then, the DDH problem can be ð"0; T 0Þ-solved, where "0 
"=4 and T 0  T þ TfQH þ ð7þ n2ÞTfQconf , where Tf is the
time to perform a modular exponentiation.
Proof. Let D ¼ ðga; gb; gcÞ be an instance of the DDH
problem; the goal is to decide if D ¼ DDH or D ¼ Drand.
To do it, we will run the hypothetical adversary F
against the scheme of Daza et al. We initialize the
scheme with the same public parameters that appear in
the given instance of the DDH problem: the primes p and
q and the element g. We send to F the information about
the sets and the structures: S, , A, U, and C.
Since we are assuming that the hash function H :
f0; 1g ! G behaves as a random function, we maintain
a table TABH as follows: When F asks for the value
HðCÞ for some conference C  U, we look for the input
C in the table TABH . If it is already in the table, we
return to F the corresponding output. If not, we choose
at random C 2 Z q and define hC ¼ HðCÞ ¼ ðgaÞC . We
return this value to F and store the new relation in
TABH . The condition hC1 6¼ hC2 must be satisfied for any
two different conferences C1 6¼ C2.
In an analogous way, we manage a table TABH^ for
the values of the random hash function H^ that is used in
the proofs of knowledge.
The adversary F plays game G against the scheme
and we must simulate all of the information that F
obtains in the different steps of the game. Note that the
simulation that we propose below will be consistent only
in the case where D ¼ DDH :
1. F chooses a subset B 2 A of corrupted servers.
Without loss of generality (adding, if necessary,
some players to the original subset B), we can
assume that B is a maximal nonauthorized
subset, that is, for any server Si 62 B, it is fulfilled
that B [ fSig 2 .
2. The initialization phase of the scheme must be
executed, which involves only the servers. The
adversary obtains the public information and the
private information of the corrupted servers. We
proceed as follows: We compute SimðB; gbÞ,
which is all the information that the adversary
would obtain in an execution of the joint protocol
for the generation of a shared secret value  such
that g ¼ gb (described in Section 3.2.1). This
information, SimðB; gbÞ, consists (basically) of the
values f0jgSj2B and fg
0
igSi2P .
3. In Step 3 of the game, F chooses different
conferences C0  U. For each user U 2 C0, with
ElGamal public key y, the adversary F must
receive all the information that U and servers in B
would see in an execution of the protocol where
U obtains an encryption of the conference key
C0 ¼ hC 0 ¼ gaC0 b. We allow the adversary F to
know the secret key of user U and, thus, to obtain
the final conference key C0 .
We are implicitly assuming that gc ¼ gab. So,
first, we compute an ElGamal encryption (under
U ’s public key, y) of the assumed final key
C 0 ¼ gcC0 : We choose at random  2 Z q and
compute
r ¼ g and s ¼ ðgcÞC0 y:
Then, we compute the partial ElGamal encryp-
tions, starting with servers Sj 2 B; for them, we
know the shares 0j, so we choose at random j 2
Z q and compute
rj ¼ gj and sj ¼ gaC0ð Þ
0
jyj :
We can easily compute Proofj for these servers Sj
as well since we know the values 0j and j.
Finally, for servers Si 62 B, we know
that B [ fSig 2 . This implies the exis-
tence of values 0 and fjgSj2B such that
 ðSiÞ ¼ 0 ðDÞ þ
P
Sj2B j ðSjÞ. Then, we can
compute the values
ri ¼ r0
Y
Sj2B
r
j
j and si ¼ s0
Y
Sj2B
s
j
j ;
which form a valid ElGamal encryption of the
value h
0i
C0 ¼ ðgaC0 Þ
0
i under public key y.
To simulate Proofi for servers Si 62 B, we
proceed as we described in Section 4.2. We
choose at random w1; w2; h 2 Z q and define
H^ Di; ri; si; g; hC 0 ; y; g
w1Dhi ; g
w2rhi ; h
w1
C0 y
w2shi
  ¼ h:
This relation is stored in the table TABH^ . Note
that there cannot be collisions among different
simulations of proofs of knowledge because there
is only one simulation for the values Di, hC0 , y
corresponding to server Si, conference C
0, and
user U with public key y. However, there can be
other kind of collisions if some input of H^
obtained in a simulation has been already asked
to the random oracle by F . If we detect such a
collision, we abort the game and output a random
answer to the given instance of the DDH
problem. Since we simulate at most nQconf proofs
of knowledge and F is allowed to make at most
QH^ queries to the random oracle H^, the prob-
ability  that such a collision occurs is
  nQconfQH^
q3
:
Since Qconf < q=ð2nÞ and QH^ < q2=2, the prob-
ability that no collision occurs is 1  > 1=2.
4. The adversary F chooses a conference C different
from the previous conferences C0. We can
simulate the information that F would obtain
from the execution of the protocol for C, exactly
in the same way as in the previous step. The
difference is that now we do not allow F to
obtain the ElGamal decryption, which is, suppo-
sedly, the final conference key C .
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Note that this Step 4 can eventually occur in
parallel to the previous Step 3; the simulation can
be done in exactly the same way. As well, new
key conference queries, such as those in Step 3,
could be made by the adversary now for
conferences C0 satisfying C0 6¼ C. They are an-
swered exactly as explained in Step 3.
5. In Step 5, we send to F the value ðgcÞC . Note that,
if gc ¼ gab, this value is exactly C .
6. The adversary F outputs a bit b0.
We answer to the given instance D of the DDH
problem as follows: If F outputs 1, we state that D
follows the Diffie-Hellman distribution or, in other
words, that c ¼ abmod q. If F outputs 0, we state that
c 6¼ abmod q.
Let us compute the probability "0 that we solve the
DDH problem correctly. If some collision happens in the
management of the table TABH^ , then we succeed with
probability 1/2. If no collisions occur, then we can
distinguish two cases. On the one hand, if D ¼ DDH ,
which happens with probability 1/2 since D is taken at
random between DDH and Drand, all of the values that F
receives during the game are consistent and, in Step 6, he
receives the correct value ofC (that is, b
 ¼ 1). In this case,
byhypothesis,F will output the correct answer b0 ¼ b ¼ 1
with probability at least "þ 1=2. And, with this prob-
ability, we will answer correctly thatD follows the Diffie-
Hellman distribution. On the other hand, if D ¼ Drand
(which also happens with probability 1/2), all of the
information thatF receives during the game is completely
independent of the bit bwhichdefines the game, soF will
output the correct b0 ¼ 0with probability 1/2.
Summing up, considering all of the possible cases, we
obtain that the probability of correctly solving the
instance of the DDH problem is at least
  1
2
þ ð1 Þ  1
2
 2"þ 1
2
þ 1
2
 1
2
 	
¼ 1
2
þ "ð1 Þ
2
>
1
2
þ "
4
:
Therefore, we get "0  "=4. With respect to the
execution time T 0 of our algorithm for solving the
DDH problem, if we consider as significant only the
time Tf to perform modular exponentiations, then T
0
is the same as the execution time T of F plus the
time of answering the QH queries to the hash
(random) oracle H plus the time of simulating the
information that F obtains in game G (ElGamal
partial encryptions, proofs of knowledge, etc.). Sum-
ming up, we have T 0  T þ TfQH þ ð7þ n2ÞTfQconf . tu
5 A MODIFICATION TO AVOID THE RANDOM
ORACLE MODEL
The security of the distributed key distribution schemes in
[11], [24] can be proven in the random oracle model. This is
a usual strategy in cryptography, although the assumption
of the total randomness of a hash function is unrealistic.
Even if a proof in the random oracle model is always better
than nothing, efforts are constantly being made by
cryptographers to provide protocols whose security does
not rely on this assumption.
In their work, Naor et al. [24] briefly mention a possible
modification in the way in which the values hC are
computed in order to avoid the use of hash function H
and, therefore, the assumption of the random oracle model
for this function in the security proof. We detail this
modification here, which is also valid for the scheme of
Daza et al. that we study in this paper. However, note that
the random oracle model will still be necessary for the
function H^ if we consider the zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge to achieve robustness against malicious adver-
saries (in both schemes).
The idea is that servers will jointly compute a value hC 2
G ¼ hgi for each conference C and store this relation in a
table. In some sense, the management of this table by the
servers plays the role of a random oracle model. Since the
values hC can be random, servers can compute them offline
in the initialization phase. Later, when a new conference
key is requested, they publicly assign to this conference C
one of the precomputed values hC and store the relation in
the table. When all of the users in conference C have
obtained the key C , they erase this relation from the table.
Note that this solution may be suitable only for scenarios
where the expected number of conferences is not too big
since the size of the table that must be managed by the
servers is linear on the number of expected conferences.
There are different possibilities for this joint generation
of the value hC . A first (naive) solution consists of each
server Si 2 S generating, at random, a value C;i 2 Z q and
then broadcasting the value hC;i ¼ gC;i . The final value to
be stored in the table is
hC ¼
Y
Si2S
hC;i ¼ g
P
Si2S
C;i
:
However, this solution requires simultaneous broadcast
channels [21] for all of the servers in S to ensure that all of
the values hC;i are broadcast at the same time, with
independence. If not, a server Sj corrupted by the
adversary could wait and choose its value hC;j in order to
result in a desired hC . Later, he can do the same for a
different conference C0 and produce, for example, hC0 ¼ h2C .
In this case, if the adversary could have access to the key
C ¼ hC , then he would be able to compute the conference
key C0 ¼ hC0 ¼ 2C , thus breaking the security of the
scheme.
Such an assumption about simultaneous broadcast
channels may be very strong in some scenarios. For this
reason, an alternative (and less efficient) solution is that
servers run, for each value hC to be computed, the protocol
described in Section 3.2.1. With this last modification, the
security of the two distributed key distribution schemes
[11], [24] can be proven in a similar way. Since the protocol
in Section 3.2.1 is simulatable, the information that the
adversary obtains in the generation of the values hC can be
perfectly simulated in the security proof. The relation
between the times T 0 and T , in Theorem 1, will now include
the time of simulating Qconf times the execution of the
aforementioned protocol. Note that this use of verifiable
secret sharing techniques (i.e., protocol in Section 3.2.1) to
achieve “mutually independent channels” is not new; see
the original paper [9] on verifiable secret sharing.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have analyzed an existing distributed key
distribution scheme [11] whose security had not been
studied at all. This scheme is especially suitable in real
scenarios where users have low computational resources
and servers are even paid in some way for doing most of
the work. We have considered a formal security model for
this kind of scheme. We have proven that this specific
scheme achieves the desired level of security in the random
oracle model as long as the DDH problem is hard to solve.
To do so, we have first replaced the protocol for the joint
generation of a random value in [11] with a more secure
one and we have also analyzed the security of a zero-
knowledge protocol, which provides robustness to the
scheme.
We also discuss a modification of the scheme in [11]
which is also valid for the scheme in [24], which replaces
the use of a hash function with a table that must be
managed by the servers. On the one hand, this results in
less efficient distributed key distribution schemes, maybe
only suitable for scenarios where the expected number of
conferences is small, but, on the other hand, this modifica-
tion allows us to avoid the strong assumption that this hash
function behaves as a random oracle.
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